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Abstract 
As current policy frameworks are expiring in 2020, the EU is revisiting its energy technology policy 
for the post-2020 horizon. The main long-run objective for energy technology policy is to foster the 
achievement of ambitious EU goals for decarbonisation by 2050. Given this objective, we discuss how 
European energy technology policy towards 2050 can be effective despite i) uncertain carbon prices, 
ii) uncertain technological change and iii) uncertain or alternating policy paradigms shifting its focus 
from decarbonisation to competition or security of supplies. Public support to innovation in energy 
technologies is needed to correct for market failures and imperfections, as well as to fully exploit trade 
opportunities of such technologies on the world market. Benefits from EU intervention can be 
expected from the coordination of national policies. Effective European technology push should put 
strong emphasis on pushing consumption-oriented and enabling technologies, as these offer a no-
regret strategy vis-à-vis any future context. 
Keywords 
European energy technology policy, decarbonisation, innovation, uncertain policy context, technology 
push 
  
Motivation* 
In 2009, the European Council agreed on the long-term EU climate policy goal to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions inside the EU to at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Achieving this goal poses 
significant challenges for EU policy makers. Most low-carbon energy technologies are not yet 
competitive or even not technologically proven. Moreover, the current period of austerity has imposed 
tight constraints on national budgets and has forced governments to rethink fiscal policies, including 
support for research and innovation. Different Member States have recently abandoned several 
expensive energy policies, mostly those promoting clean energy technologies. The EU needs to revisit 
its energy technology policy for the post-2020 horizon. Current policy frameworks on the EU-level are 
running out, such as the Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) and the EU has to establish a 
lasting policy framework that fosters the achievement of its ambitious commitments for 
decarbonisation by 2050. 
In the light of these recent developments, this article discusses how European energy technology 
policy towards 2050 can be effective despite i) uncertain carbon prices, ii) uncertain technological 
change and iii) uncertain or alternating policy paradigms shifting its focus from decarbonisation to 
competition or supply security. We first argue that public support to innovation in low-carbon 
technologies is needed to correct for market failures and imperfections, as well as to fully exploit trade 
opportunities of such technologies on the world market. Benefits from EU intervention can be 
expected from the coordination of national policies, and European co-funding also can leverage 
additional national and private funds. We finally argue that European technology push – to offer a 
feasible no-regret strategy vis-à-vis uncertain energy market and political developments on the way to 
2050 – should strongly emphasize pushing consumption-oriented and enabling technologies. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the origins of and the justification for 
technology push and illustrates benefits from EU involvement and European co-funding of innovation. 
Section 3 introduces the three major sources of uncertainties that policymakers have to take account of 
when designing a future energy technology policy. Having these uncertainties in mind, Section 4 
derives a robust and feasible policy, with respect to its design and technology-specific content. Section 
5 concludes. 
1. Rationales for European technology push 
Policy intervention needs to be justified in terms of its economic or social benefits. To this end, this 
section establishes rationales for public support to low-carbon innovation as well as for EU 
involvement in this respect. Finally, this section briefly discusses the effectiveness of currently 
implemented European technology push. 
1.1 Rationales for technology push  
As discussed in-depth in Ruester et al. (2013), policy intervention in research, development, 
demonstration and deployment (RDD&D) of low-carbon energy technologies can be motivated by 
market failures on the one hand, or by strategic industry and trade policy issues on the other. First, the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is a global public good and unless such reduction is adequately 
rewarded, or emissions properly charged, the incentive to develop and deploy low-carbon technologies 
will be too low, see also Stern (2006). Second, research activities are accompanied by positive 
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externalities from knowledge spillovers and without a very restrictive access regime, innovating firms 
cannot fully appropriate their returns, reducing innovation efforts below socially optimal levels, see 
Martin and Scott (2000) and Foxon (2003). Third, capital markets suffer from information 
asymmetries among innovators and investors. Many investors are constrained in equity as well as debt 
capital, not only due to the limited availability of funds as a result of the financial crisis, but also since 
certain types of (especially small or new) actors face difficulties to raise available funds, see Hyytinen 
and Toivanen (2005). Last, policy intervention may relate to strategic industry and trade policy, 
pushing or protecting certain technologies on the global market.  
Different policy instruments aim at taking account of each of the above mentioned rationales. 
Market pull instruments such as carbon pricing schemes or payments subsidizing the deployment of 
certain technologies like the widely implemented national renewable support schemes, mainly address 
the positive externalities of clean energy production. In contrast, technology push mainly targets the 
correction of spillover effects accompanying the innovation process. Besides monetary transfers, 
technology push might also shift financial risks from entrepreneurs to public authorities by 
guaranteeing financial support in case research does not turn out to be successful or scalable for 
market implementation. Thus, technology push also addresses capital market imperfections and, in 
case of a strong push, technology performance on the world market.  
To shed light on the financial parameters that justify technology push, Figure 1 depicts a simplified 
illustration of the innovation chain and characterizes each step in terms of its investment needs and 
types of risks and returns. Whereas technical risks are dominant in the very early stages of the 
innovation chain and innovators’ main concern is the financing of the research activities, political and 
commercial risks become more relevant as technologies evolve along the chain.  
There is a consensus in energy technology policy literature that market pull alone does not lead to 
the desired outcomes. Instead, a well-designed policy involves pull to deal with the environmental 
externality, and, at the same time, complementary technology push to deal with the knowledge and 
spillover externalities, see Horbach (2007) or Nemet (2009). As concluded in Grubb (2004), the 
relative importance of technology push to market pull increases as one moves from technologies close 
to market competitiveness towards highly immature ones. Especially the central stages of the value 
chain, commercial-scale demonstration and early deployment, involve substantial investment needs 
accompanied by still non-negligible risks. This “valley of death”, where the key challenge is the 
transition from publicly co-financed to private operations, is discussed in-depth elsewhere, see 
Murphy and Edwards (2003) and Weyant (2011).  
Figure 1: Simplified innovation chain  
 
Source: Own depiction 
2.2 Rationales for EU involvement  
Policy intervention and corresponding policy instruments can be governed by the EU, jointly 
coordinated among countries, or by individual Member States who seek to intervene mainly on their 
 home market. Nonetheless, the challenges are (at least) of European nature, with externalities and 
spillovers being phenomena that cross national borders. Therefore, relying only on individual Member 
State action is likely to lead to a sub-optimal outcome. 
From an institutional perspective, there are shared competences between Member States and the 
EU regarding the achievement of the European environmental and energy policy goals (Art. 192 and 
194, Treaty of the Functioning of the EU) as well as related to actions that ensure the conditions 
necessary for the competitiveness of the European industry (Art. 173). As for technology push, it is 
thus necessary to investigate whether there are substantial economic benefits to be gained from EU 
involvement, but at the same time to set those benefits into relation with the costs of pooling public 
regulatory power at this highest political level: 
Benefits from EU intervention can be expected from the coordination of national policies. The 
currently implemented bottom-up approach with the 20-20-20 targets being specified in EU Directives 
(2009/28/EC; 2009/29/EC and accompanying Decision 406/2009/EC; 2012/27/EC) that have to be 
implemented into national laws, resulted in a wide set of national policy instruments and support 
programs. Technology push initiated at the EU level, in contrast, can avoid an unnecessary duplication 
of national or regional initiatives. A common EU funding scheme can also avoid that Member States 
would only fund technologies that are produced within their own borders and free-ride on third 
countries to push other technologies. Besides, different studies show that European co-funding can 
leverage substantial additional national and private funds (EC, 2011b; Liljelund et al., 2011). 
Moreover, most of the Member States simply are too small to implement certain instruments or to 
compete on a global scale with economies such as the US or China. When joint action is taken, 
technology but also industry and trade policies are more credible towards world market competitors, 
while also being more credible for attracting foreign investment. And also for overcoming the 
financial crisis and relaxing funding constraints, the EU has to play its role, as the financial crisis 
clearly is a European problem calling for European solutions. 
Following the principle of subsidiarity, EU action, however, shall only be taken when it is more 
effective than actions at national, regional, or local level. Potential drawbacks of EU involvement 
might be the disregard of national specificities, the reduction of institutional competition between 
alternative policy approaches, and the loss of decentralized ‘willingness to do more’. Considering the 
above arguments in favour of EU intervention, it can be conjectured that they outweigh their costs for 
some policy areas where strong coordination is needed (such as the EU ETS). However, at the same 
time when EU regulations become themselves complex and alien to national habits, also transaction 
costs increase and might outweigh the benefits of EU intervention. In Section 4 we will discuss the 
importance of recognizing the subsidiarity principle and transactions costs with respect to prioritizing 
technologies that are to be pushed on the European level. 
2.3 Status quo of currently implemented European technology push 
As pointed out above, a mix of technology push and market pull instruments dominates relying on just 
one class of instrument and in the EU indeed a mix of both instruments prevails. In this respect 
technology push has to be evaluated in the context of implemented market pull. 
The main market pull instrument is the EU-wide emission trading scheme (EU ETS) which was 
introduced in 2003 and substantially strengthened with the 2009 climate and energy policy package.
1
 
The EU ETS is accompanied by a broad spectrum of national measures supporting the deployment of 
low-carbon technologies (Ecofys et al., 2011). These measures aim at achieving the binding national 
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 Directive 2009/29/EC considers a single EU-wide cap on emission allowances from 2013 on, the stepwise replacement of 
a free allocation by auctioning, and an enlarged list of activities and GHGs covered. Decision 2010/634/EU sets the total 
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targets for the share of renewable energy sources in gross final energy consumption by 2020 and 
follow an approach of indirect promotion for low-carbon technologies through guaranteeing certain 
revenue streams in addition to the market value of low-carbon technologies. 
Complementary technology push offers a direct promotion of low-carbon technologies. At the 
European level, for this sake, the SET Plan has been adopted in 2008 as the so called ‘technology 
pillar’ of the EU energy and climate policy. Industrial Initiatives bring together industry, the research 
community, Member States and the Commission. Strategic objectives have been formulated based on 
a set of Technology Roadmaps that identify priority actions for different sectors for the decade from 
2010 to 2020. More specific Implementation Plans, containing more detailed descriptions of proposed 
RDD&D activities, as well as suggestions about potential funding sources, are developed regularly for 
three-year periods. However, the current SET Plan has a limited time horizon, expiring in 2020. In 
addition, all planning and priority setting is conducted within the individual Industrial Initiatives, and 
thus, it does not necessarily support an optimal (cost-efficient) portfolio of low-carbon technologies, 
i.e. decarbonisation at least cost.  
Technology push in the form of direct support to innovation can involve a whole set of financing 
instruments including not only research grants but also low-interest loans and loan guarantees, public 
equity, technology prizes, et cetera. As concluded in Olmos et al. (2012), such instruments are indeed 
policy instruments. In addition to their function of closing the gap between the cost of innovation and 
funds private parties are willing to contribute, they might be able to target specific technologies and 
types of innovating entities. Current practice shows that subsidies in the form of grants and contracts – 
the most attractive form of support from the innovators’ perspective, but also the most expensive one 
for the public sector – are, by far, the preferred policy instruments to fund clean energy innovation of 
any type.  
Recent policy initiatives already are a first step towards a “smarter” financing support. The 
European Energy Efficiency Fund is a public-private partnership offering different types of debt and 
equity instruments to projects dedicated to energy efficiency, small-scale renewables and clean urban 
transport projects. The Risk Sharing Finance Facility has been jointly developed by the Commission 
and the EIB to co-finance higher-risk R&D involving complex products and technologies, or being 
subject to unproven markets and intangible assets. Support of up to EUR 300mn per project is 
primarily provided in the form of loans and loan guarantees and some equity financing coming from 
the European Investment Fund. The Horizon 2020 program will include output-based funding such as 
technology prizes. Loan and equity financing are expected to play a greater role, too.  
3. Sources of uncertainty for designing optimal technology push 
Best practice for technology push will depend on the overall energy policy context. This context is 
uncertain, with uncertainty originating from three sources: the adequateness of carbon price signals, 
the set of available decarbonisation technologies, and potential paradigm shifts in EU energy policy 
away from decarbonisation. As discussed below, consequences of these uncertainties might call for an 
even stronger technology push than today. 
3.1 Uncertain carbon prices 
The policy context for (European) technology push is defined by market pull regimes, and here 
foremost by the EU ETS and the adequateness of the carbon price signal. Today, it can be heavily 
doubted that based on the current scheme and the currently determined emission cap, carbon prices in 
the magnitude of those reported in different EU Energy Roadmap scenarios
2
 can be implemented. One 
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 Carbon prices in the underlying simulation exercises are determined such that 2050 targets are reached, assuming equal 
prices/values for ETS and non-ETS sectors. These prices range between 234 and 310 EUR/t (EC, 2011). 
 can expect severe difficulties to implement a ‘high-enough’, adequate carbon price and also to include 
more types of greenhouse gas emissions into the scheme. Obviously, some sectors are more affected 
than others, as will be the case for different EU Member States, see Delgado (2007) and Ellerman et 
al. (2010). Especially countries being specialized in carbon-intensive products most likely will oppose 
a strong carbon pricing scheme and will advocate exemptions for certain sectors or the free allocation 
of emission allowances to certain user groups, a scenario that is even more relevant with the current 
EU and financial crises raising the question whether such a policy would be affordable for all Member 
States. 
The recent rejection by the European Parliament of the back-loading proposal further decreases the 
chances that sufficiently tight emission caps will be introduced soon, and it is open whether as a result 
individual Member States might follow the British example. The UK Government in 2011 unilaterally 
introduced a carbon price floor of GBP 16/ton, following a linear path up to GBP 30/ton in 2020, see 
House of Commons (2013).  
In summary, given the current absence of a strong enough carbon price, together with the necessity 
to accelerate low-carbon innovation, as highlighted in Kemfert and Schumacher (2005), Stern (2006) 
or Aghion et al. (2009), the need for technology push further gains in importance. 
3.2 Technological shocks 
The EU Energy Roadmap scenarios build on a menu of essentially known technologies. In 2050, the 
energy system will likely be extremely different than it is today. Nonetheless, the optimal portfolio of 
decarbonisation technologies has a very long time horizon, not only looking ahead to the 2050 target, 
but technological lock-ins will persist even beyond. But it is not only this very long-term nature 
inherent in the path-dependency of technological development. Also recent developments such as the 
Fukushima accident influence possible future market environments. For instance, a “2050 bridging 
role” was still given to nuclear in the first version of the German energy strategy in late 2010, whereas 
the country announced a nuclear phase out until 2022 only one year later as a response to the 
Fukushima accident. 
Possible shocks might not only eliminate technology options, but could also add new means of 
decarbonisation. Whereas the International Energy Agency in its World Energy Outlook 2007 (when 
the 20-20-20 strategy was adopted by the European Council) predicted a moderate growth for US gas 
production and did not mention shale gas at all, the World Energy Outlook 2011 is talking about a 
possible “golden age of gas”. A (more global) shale gas revolution may severely shake up our today's 
EU energy strategy: The production of shale gas, an unconventional gas resource, rose from less than 
1% of domestic gas production in the US in 2000 to over 20% in 2010. Forecasts predict a continuous 
rise up to more than 45% by 2035, see Stevens (2012). This recent development transformed the gas 
market into a buyers’ market and several experts see a huge potential for shale gas worldwide.3  
Assuming that the US will become a large-scale exporter of cheap gas and that it is possible to 
replicate the American experience in other parts of the world, the availability of cheap gas on the 
market would allow for a certain degree of decarbonisation at low cost (or even net benefits). Hence, 
the ‘rational’ price of carbon might well fall extremely low under the push of shale gas as a ‘market-
based’ decarbonisation technology. Nevertheless, gas is still a fossil fuel and the 2050 decarbonisation 
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is produced based on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing which involves the injection of chemicals. Severe 
environmental concerns have created strong local oppositions, and France or Bulgaria have already banned shale gas 
operations.  
objective cannot be reached with shifting to gas alone. Shale gas may not only substitute for dirty coal 
but also for expensive renewables, and the lack of a carbon price signal will inhibit investments into 
the development and deployment of alternative low-carbon technologies.  
In summary, 2050 is a very long-term horizon and technological shocks and revolutions can have 
important, unpredictable impacts on the available set of and relative cost of decarbonisation 
technologies. There are not only substantial uncertainties regarding viable decarbonisation 
technologies within the context of the EU Energy Roadmap, but there are also possible futures that are 
not yet recognized in 2050 roadmaps. Hence, also technology push strategies that do not take account 
of technological breakthroughs or political barriers to technology deployment are likely to be 
ineffective.  
3.3 Paradigm shifts in EU energy policy 
Decarbonisation has become a central theme on the political agenda of European energy policy. 
Energy policy, however, traditionally builds upon three fundamental pillars: sustainability and 
competitiveness and supply security. Shifts of policy focus towards one or the other of these three 
paradigms have been frequently observable in the recent past. Whereas in 2007 European energy 
policy had a strong sustainability focus, the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in winter 2008/2009 and 
resulting gas shortages also in European countries reinforced discussions about the security of energy 
supplies. With the financial and economic crisis, concerns about economic growth and 
competitiveness of domestic industries were back in the centre of political discussions.  
As for shifts towards competitiveness of European firms, climate policy imposes asymmetric cost 
on the regulated agents and at least in the short-run bears the risks of being detrimental for economic 
growth. Carbon pricing increases the industry’s cost, which raises concerns from an economic point of 
view (loss in competitiveness), but also from an environmental perspective (carbon leakage). There is 
considerable debate about the extent of carbon leakage and policy measures mitigating this 
phenomenon (e.g. Clò, 2010; Caron, 2012; Antimiani et al., 2012). But there are also considerations 
about positive interactions between decarbonisation and economic growth. Fankhauser et al. (2008) 
argue that “growth theory has long identified technical change and innovation as major source of 
economic growth” (p. 426) and that long-term dynamic innovation effects induced by climate policies 
will bring about a net job creation. However, a shift in the European policy focus towards prioritizing 
competitiveness would certainly not improve conditions for successful implementation of 
decarbonisation policies and further aggravate the implementation of carbon pricing schemes with 
adequate price signals. Technology push in such a context clearly gains in importance. 
As for shifts in favour of supply security, at first sight, there seems to be a certain conflict with the 
achievement of environmental objectives, in particular CO2 mitigation, since these restrictions may 
limit options of energy supply. A balanced portfolio ensuring a well-diversified supply mix again 
might call for stronger push policies. But climate policies can induce a broader use of low-carbon 
technologies, and thus also have a positive impact on diversification. Studying the UK electricity 
system, Grubb et al. (2006) find that the introduction of an emission target of 60% will lead to a 
substantial increase in diversity of generation sources (mainly driven by a declining dominance of gas 
in the fuel mix), whereas, in contrast, in the absence of any emission target, diversity decreases.  
4. Implications for European technology push 
Several implications for a feasible European technology push strategy arise. As shown, technology 
push is needed to account for several market failures and imperfections. Benefits from EU intervention 
can be expected from the coordination of national policies. In addition, existing uncertainties and 
possible consequences of low carbon prices, technological shocks or shifts in policy paradigm may 
even call for stronger technology push, if decarbonisation is to be reached by 2050. As public money 
 for technology push is rather limited at the Member State but also at the EU levels, this section 
proposes which technology priorities offer effective no-regret push strategies. We also discuss 
international trade measures as a potential “regret-strategy”. Lastly, we conclude on the optimal 
division of Member State and EU responsibilities when pursuing these strategies. 
4.1 No-regret strategies for technology push 
Regarding the choice of technologies to be pushed, certain low-carbon technologies can become 
indispensable to achieve the transition to a low-carbon economy and at the same time there might be 
reasonable concerns that, without extra support, they will not be developed and deployed at the 
necessary scale and/or on time. This could for instance be the case for carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS). All scenarios of the EU Energy Roadmap contain a substantial part of electricity 
generation using this technology (between 10% in the ‘high RES’ and 33% in the ‘Reference’ case in 
2050). Other roadmaps (ECF, 2010; Eurelectric, 2011; IEA, 2012) present very similar numbers. 
Hence, if the timely deployment of CCS is a necessary precondition to achieve climate objectives, 
further support to innovation and especially demonstration projects can be justified.
4
 Similar 
arguments also hold for other low-carbon technologies. Stronger push policies here would become 
even more relevant if the large-scale deployment of CCS turns out to be infeasible and/or if more 
Member states decide a nuclear phase-out. 
Even though without detailed cost- and technology data at hand, disaggregated technology-specific 
recommendations as to what technologies and research activities to push are not possible, we can draw 
several conclusions that will generally hold: 
A prioritization of low-carbon production technologies by policy makers entails high risks of 
“picking wrong winners”, especially so because future energy market developments like the evolution 
of shale gas production and fossil fuel prices may entirely change the benefits and market value of 
different production technologies. The situation is different for certain consumption-oriented 
technologies, comprising mainly energy conservation and efficiency enhancing measures. Several 
reasons argue for pushing such technologies. First, there is a consensus that the long-term EU climate 
objectives cannot be reached without substantial improvements in energy efficiency, see Mundaca 
(2008). Moreover, due to their inherent nature of being less manufacturing-oriented but rather to a 
large extent relying on installing new appliances, incentivizing smart behaviour, et cetera, the 
implementation of energy conservation measures typically is quite labour-intensive, and, therefore, 
entails a larger positive effect on job creation. Limited labour mobility implies that new jobs are 
created within the EU. Besides, pushing consumption-oriented technologies generally does not lead to 
large biases in energy markets, as is the case for production technologies where support for low-
carbon generation will inevitably crowd out remaining competing (and also incumbent) technologies 
and, hence, can bias market efficiency in often unanticipated ways. 
Hence, pushing consumption-oriented technologies dominates pushing production-oriented 
technologies in terms of both feasibility and robustness. First, the above arguments indicate that such 
push is politically feasible: Opposing to a push for production technologies, that often would benefit 
certain Member States in which the major suppliers are located, energy efficiency enhancing measures 
benefit all EU industries, those offering energy efficiency products and all industries applying it. 
Hence, this push strategy is independent of geographic location and creates jobs throughout all 
Member States. Second, such push is robust with respect to future energy market developments: 
Consuming less is a no-regret policy. The EU might well look after its own ‘energy technology and 
security’ revolution in consuming significantly less energy.  
                                                     
4
 However, as discussed elsewhere in-depth (e.g. Hirschhausen et al., 2010), CCS can only thrive, if at the same time 
financial, political and regulatory risks are reduced.  
For similar reasons, pushing enabling technologies (such as grids, advanced metering or market 
facilitation via ICT equipment) is a valuable strategy. As for the technology group discussed above, 
investments typically are quite domestically labour-intensive. However, for grid infrastructures – as 
for enabling technologies in general – the appropriate magnitude of investment will depend on the 
amount and type of renewable energy that enters the power system. The optimal system architecture 
also will depend on whether we move towards ‘European-wide energy superhighways’ with massive 
solar energy being imported from North Africa, huge amounts of offshore wind energy being 
produced in the North Sea and nuclear energy from Eastern Europe contributing to Western European 
electricity supply, or whether we move instead towards a system of rising local energy autonomy, 
featured by widespread distributed generation and demand response.  
4.2 Industry and trade policy as ‘regret-strategy’ for technology push 
As mentioned above, European technology push can have its justification as a means to respond to 
fierce global competition in green-tech markets and to help to keep wealth within the Union. Whereas 
the burden to finance market pull measures always is with consumers and tax payers but benefits can 
be reaped by both domestic innovators and producers, but also market entrants from outside the EU, 
technology push can be designed such that it favours domestic players. Explicitly targeting specific 
technologies also allows policy makers to accelerate technology development and support industrial 
leadership. This strategy is promising especially for high-tech segments or parts of the value chain that 
cannot be outsourced to low-cost competitors.  
Industry policy can either rely on competitive forces to enable (green) growth, or might 
compromise on competition within the EU in favour of EU champions that compete globally. The long 
lasting debate just became topical once more with the recent EU Communication on industrial policy 
(COM(2012) 582). Trade policy measures may either explicitly support home technologies on the 
world market (via subsidies), or protect them from foreign competition (via import quotas or tariffs). If 
the EU was the first mover, the rationale is to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. Early 
literature on strategic trade policy (Spencer and Brander, 1983; Krugman, 1987) finds that, if an 
industry is characterized by increasing returns to scale, subsidizing home firms that then can commit 
to an increased future output, threatens the foreign firm, which will decrease its output to not lower 
market prices. Subsidies given to the home firm are outweighed by the profits shifted from the foreign 
to the home firm. Whenever the EU would have to react to such measures undertaken by other 
countries, the rationale is to sanction the first mover.  
The global market for clean technology is huge in volume. According to Roland Berger and WWF 
(2012), in 2011, the market volume grew by 10% to about EUR 198bn. Furthermore, markets are 
relatively new and often not perfectly competitive. Hence, it is tempting for governments to engage in 
trade policy to push domestic firms. Current trade disputes related to clean technologies, however, 
illustrate the complexity of trade policy. Most prominently, China is heavily supporting its solar PV 
industry, leading to anti-dumping counter measures by the US and the EU. Likewise, but on a smaller 
scale, Argentina is currently filing a case at the WTO, arguing that Spain was banning imports of 
biodiesel from Argentina by obliging consumers to buy biodiesel produced in Spain to fulfil EU 
targets on renewable energy. 
Such policy measures also bear considerable risk. Besides provoking counter measures, subsidizing 
home technologies on the world market might lead to falling prices and vanishing industry profits. 
Within the above example, China’s aggressive policy led to a drastic fall of the world price of solar 
panels and hence the effectiveness of this policy in shifting profits can be doubted. China’s 
manufacturing capacity grew so much that an enormous oversupply was created. Therefore, it has to 
be noted that strategic industry- and trade policy measures might be possible regret measures. There is 
a fine line between supporting technologies and subsidizing industries. The strong reliance on 
competitive forces as outlined in several EU Directives should be maintained.  
 4.3 Division of Member State and EU responsibilities 
While especially for industry and trade policy strategies for green technologies a joint European 
approach is beneficial, the overall policy design for technology push, however, should rely to a large 
extent on bottom-up participation. Especially technology projects with ‘normal risk and return 
profiles’ are well suited to be supported by individual Member States, leaving high-risk support for the 
EU. While a bottom-up approach is certainly needed for national action plans and national funding, 
also the push coming from the European level will be bargained beforehand. Political considerations, 
such as who are beneficiaries of support, will aggravate the planning and priority setting for 
technologies.  
These barriers become even larger since Member States are inhomogenous in their technology base 
and ability to finance. The economic and financial crisis has affected all Member States, but not all in 
the same way and to the same extent. Less affected countries, mostly in northern Europe, have entirely 
different starting position for decarbonisation policies than more affected Member States, mostly in 
southern Europe. On the one hand, there are a few countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, 
which can benefit from relatively low financing cost, public funding opportunities and a quite high 
consumer willingness to pay for energy policy. On the other hand, there are many countries that suffer 
from extremely high financing cost, highly limited public funds, and consumers not willing, or able, to 
afford low-carbon technology support. In addition, low-carbon technology bases range from strong 
low-carbon industry positions for e.g. wind energy in Germany or Denmark, or nuclear in France, to 
countries that do not have any of those or similar technology advantages yet. These differences 
hamper agreements on a unified approach for technology support. Therefore, designing an energy 
technology policy top-down is difficult to sustain, which points out the need for decentralized 
solutions co-existing to European funding and support schemes. Decentralized solutions further 
include possibilities to adapt burden sharing to national conditions and needs.  
5. Conclusions 
Currently implemented EU policies supporting innovation in low-carbon technologies are expiring in 
2020 and the current period of austerity has imposed tight constraints on national budgets and has 
forced governments to rethink fiscal policies, including support for research and innovation. This 
leaves the EU with the mandate to establish a clear-cut, post-2020 energy technology policy. The main 
long-run objective of such an energy technology policy is to foster the achievement of the ambitious 
decarbonisation goal for 2050. Policy makers, however, face several sources of uncertainty, including 
uncertainty about future carbon prices, uncertainty about technological change and uncertain or 
alternating policy paradigms that might shift the focus from decarbonisation to competition or supply 
security.  
This article argues that public support for innovation in energy technologies is needed to correct for 
market failures and imperfections, as well as to fully exploit trade opportunities of such technologies 
on the world market. Benefits from EU intervention can be expected from the coordination of national 
policies. Regarding the choice of technologies to be pushed, certain low-carbon technologies can 
become indispensable to achieve the transition to a low-carbon economy and at the same time there 
might be reasonable concerns that without extra support they will not be developed and deployed at 
the necessary scale and/or on time. Moreover, for support to be robust against all uncertain market, 
technological and political developments, technology push should put strong a emphasis on pushing 
consumption-oriented and enabling technologies, as these offer a no-regret strategy in any future 
context. Also strategic industry and trade measure could be used to push technologies on the world 
market, but have to be implemented with care, foreseeing potential reactions from other players on the 
world market and should be in line with trade regulations. 
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